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Security Dilemma in Chechnya ==The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict== The ''security dilemma'' occurs when: what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.〔Posen, Barry. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." Survival. 35. (Spring 1993): 28〕 The term is generally used to denote the “self-defeating aspect of the quest for security in an anarchic system.” 〔Snyder, Glenn. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." World Politics. 36.4 (1984): 461〕 Cooperation among states to mute competitions can be troublesome since states fear betrayal and are uncertain of each other's actions. The security dilemma states that even when no state has any desire to attack others, none “can be sure that others’ intentions are peaceful, or will remain so; hence each must accumulate power for defense.”〔Snyder, Glenn. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." World Politics. 36.4 (1984): 461〕 A group that is forced to provide its own protection must ask questions about any neighboring group, such as, is it a threat? How much of a threat, and will this threat increase or decrease over time? 〔Posen, Barry. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." Survival. 35. (Spring 1993): 27〕 Competition between both sides will continue to a point at which the competing actors have gathered more power than needed for security, and, thus begin to threaten others. Consequently, those who feel threatened will respond in return.〔Posen, Barry. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." Survival. 35. (Spring 1993): 28〕 The concept of the security dilemma can be applied to ''ethnic conflict''. Though many regions have some type of nationalist, ethnic or religious conflicts, the intensity of conflicts vary from region to region. This variation among different ethnic conflicts can be linked with fear and uncertainty, which leads to the security dilemma. David A. Lake and Donald Rotchild state: “ethnic conflict is not caused directly by “inter-group differences, ‘ancient hatreds’ and centuries-old feuds, or the stresses of modern life within a global economy.” 〔Lake, David, and Donald Rotchild. "Containing Fear: The Origins of Management of Ethnic Conflict." International Security. 21.2 (Fall 1996): 41〕 Instead, the magnitude of ethnic conflict is caused by threat perception and fear, along with an opportunity to act on these fears. As ethnic fears arise, and groups feel uncertain about their future safety and survival, the security dilemma is likely to occur. And with it comes potential for high levels of political violence. These fears and insecurities cause polarizations in society, while emotions and memories of past histories help amplify these concerns. These “between group and within group strategic interactions produce toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that can explode into murderous violence.” 〔Lake, David, and Donald Rotchild. "Containing Fear: The Origins of Management of Ethnic Conflict." International Security. 21.2 (Fall 1996): 42〕 The emotional power of ethnic attachments is increased by the unifying effects of what are perceived to be external threats.〔Lake, David, and Donald Rotchild. "Containing Fear: The Origins of Management of Ethnic Conflict." International Security. 21.2 (Fall 1996): 56〕 The ''Russian Federation'' has many ethnic regions that are all multiethnic, but only ''Chechnya'' has experienced overt warfare.〔Kaufman, Stuart. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. 220.〕 Russians and Chechens do not trust each other's intentions and therefore, try to maximize their own security. This results in the situation of the security dilemma The Chechens have feared the Russians throughout history; rebellions would increase whenever the Russian state faced a period of doubt and uncertainty. This can be seen with the ''Russo-Turkish War'', the ''Russian Revolution of 1905'', the ''Russian Revolution of 1917'', the ''Russian Civil War'', and in the 1920s when Chechen’s resisted the Bolsheviks' collectivization.〔Kaufman, Stuart. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. 15.〕 Chechnya’s security concerns and claim for independence rests on its distinct relationship with imperial Russia, the Soviet Union and post communist Russia.〔Sakwa, Richard. Chechnya: From Past to Future. London: Anthem Press, 2005. 4.〕 However, more specifically, the security dilemma can be traced back to the 1940s when ''Joseph Stalin'' deported thousands of Chechens to the plains of Kazakhstan, the taiga of Siberia and the mountains of Kyrgyzstan because he believed the Chechens were collaborating with the Wehrmacht during the German invasion of the USSR.〔Williams, Brian. "Commemorating “The Deportation” in Post-Soviet Chechnya. The Role of Memorialization and Collective Memory in the 1994- 96 and 1999-2000 Russo-Chechen Wars."History and Memory. 12.1 (2000): 4〕 Thousands of Chechens died in sealed carts due to poor sanitary conditions, trauma, and lack of food and water. There were also some cases in which soldiers killed people rather than deporting them. Up to 700 people were burned alive in the mountain village of Khaibakh, while there are reports of people being drowned in mountain lakes.〔Remembering Stalin's deportations." BBC News. 23 Feb. 2004. Web. 6 Apr. 2013〕 This exile was a traumatic experience for the Chechen people, and helped inflame separatism ideas in the 1990s. The deportation increased tension between the two groups; the Soviet Union became a perceived threat to Chechen survival, while rising up against Soviet Rule during the 1940s made Chechens a perceived threat for the future of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 gave Chechen nationalists the opportunity to claim the independent “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.” In 1992, all regions in Russia formerly designated “autonomous republics” in the USSR signed a federation treaty, except for Chechnya and ''Tatarstan''. Soviet President ''Boris Yeltsin'' ended up signing a special political accord with the president of Tatarstan, ''Mintimer Shaimiev'', making Chechnya the only federal subject that did not sign the treaty. Chechens were reluctant to cede autonomy and declared full independence from Moscow in 1992. Tensions rose again in 1992 and 1993 as President Yeltsin threatened to invade the republic and overthrow its pro-independence leadership.〔Meier, Andrew. To the Heart of a Conflict: Chechnya. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005. 122.〕 In 1994, pro-Russian Chechen irregulars supported by Moscow, staged efforts to end ''Dzhokhar Dudayev''’s rule. But, all efforts were all unsuccessful.〔Meier, Andrew. To the Heart of a Conflict: Chechnya. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005. 122〕 President Yeltsin and the Russian Security Council signed a secret decree pledging to re-establish constitutional order in the breakaway republic.〔Tolz, Vera. "The War in Chechnya." Current History. 95. (Oct 1996): 2〕 In the early 1990s, neither federal nor local authorities had power over Chechnya. There was no police force, parliament or unified financial system in the self-proclaimed independent republic.〔Tolz, Vera. "The War in Chechnya." Current History. 95. (Oct 1996): 2〕 On 11 December 1994, Russia tried to retake the country and Yeltsin sent forty thousand Russian troops into Chechnya.〔Meier, Andrew. To the Heart of a Conflict: Chechnya. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005. 122〕 Once Russian armored columns launched an assault of ''Grozny'', the first ''Chechen war'' commenced. There are still questions about why the Russian government decided to start full-scale military operations in Chechnya. Some believed it was because Yeltsin expected it to be a quick and easy war, which would help his popularity and image as a capable leader in control of his country. Some scholars also believe the war in Chechnya war “sparked by Moscow’s desire to control an important oil pipeline that runs through the North Caucasus to Novorossiyak.” 〔Tolz, Vera. "The War in Chechnya." Current History. 95. (Oct 1996): 2〕 Tensions and arms increased as each side defensively reacted to the other. Though each side was trying to make their selves more secure, the first Chechen war caused the death of thousands of Chechens and Russians. The Russian Federation feared the disintegration of the federation and losing power; while the Chechens didn’t want lose autonomy because they lacked political status and stability in Russian culture and politics. This conflict is a case of the spiral of insecurity, in which both sides are locked in a toxic relationship with neither side wanting to let go. Though President Yeltsin believed he would win the war quickly, Chechen fighters defeated Russian troops in 1996 by staging a mass attack and retaking Grozny. This was viewed as a humiliating event for Russia, and portrayed them as incapable of controlling their own country. Though a cease-fire was signed, the question of sovereignty and Chechnya’s ultimate status remained unresolved. In 1999, the ''Second Chechen War'' was launched the Russian Federation in response to the ''Invasion of Dagestan''.〔Meier, Andrew. To the Heart of a Conflict: Chechnya. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005. 122.〕 Though the new Russian prime minister, ''Vladimir Putin'', termed the deployment an "antiterrorism" operation, not a war, the idea of Chechen independence was still the prevailing issue. Independence of Chechnya continues to go against Russia's military and energy interests in the area and it is fear from both sides that set off the security dilemma. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Security Dilemma in Chechnya」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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